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Abstract
The cleaning up of waste present in transboundary rivers, which requires
the cooperation of dierent authorities, is a problematic issue, especially
when responsibility for the discharge of the waste is not well-dened. Fol-
lowing Ni and Wang (2007) we assume that a river is a segment divided
into several regions from upstream to downstream. We show that when
the transfer rate of the waste is unknown, the clean-up cost vector provides
useful information for estimating some limits in regard to the responsi-
bility of each region. We propose a cost allocation rule, the Upstream
Responsibility rule, which takes into account these limits in distributing
costs \fairly" and we provide an axiomatic characterization of this rule
via certain properties based on basic ideas concerning the responsibility
of regions.
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1 Introduction
Motivation The presence of waste in river channels is a major environmental
problem faced by authorities since, on the one hand, waste can pollute water,
which can be harmful for people, plants and animals, causing serious diseases
and aecting ecosystems. As a consequence, the inhabitants of a region with
more waste in its part of the river confront a cost: they consume lower qual-
ity water and/or face higher water depolluting costs. On the other hand, the
presence of accumulated waste in a river is known to have a substantial eect
on the probability of ooding when there is heavy rain, so it seems advisable to
clean river channels regularly to reduce this danger. Around the world, about
200 rivers (see Ambec and Sprumont, 2002 and Barrett, 1994) ow across na-
tional borders, and a much greater number across borders between regions or
municipalities. All the activities for cleaning transboundary rivers may require
cooperation on the part of the dierent authorities involved and coordination of
eorts if they are to be eective. However, the distribution of the costs of these
activities among the dierent regions may be a problematic issue, particularly
when the extent to which each region is responsible for the waste discharged is
not well-dened.
As far as we know, the rst paper to analyze the problem of sharing the costs of
cleaning a river among dierent regions from a theoretical point of view is that
of Ni and Wang (2007). They model a river as a segment which is divided into
subsegments from upstream to downstream such that each region is located
in one of them. They assume that there is a central agency that determines
the cost of cleaning each of these segments and they axiomatically propose two
methods for allocating the total cleaning costs among all regions along the river.
The rst method, called Local Responsibility Sharing, establishes that the total
cost that each region should pay is directly the cost of cleaning the segment
in which this region is located. The second method, called Upstream Equal
Sharing, states that the total cost that each region should pay is obtained by
distributing equally the cost of cleaning each segment among the region in that
segment and all the regions situated upstream from it.1 We show that neither
1These methods are based on the theories or principles of Absolute Territorial Sovereignty
and Unlimited Territorial Integrity, respectively (see Godana, 1985 and Kilgour and Dinar,
1996).
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of these methods allocates the costs in a way that reects the responsibility of
each region in producing the waste present in river channels. The rst does
not take into consideration that the water of a river ows from one segment
to another, taking part of the waste with it. The second implicitly assumes
that the region in a segment and all the regions situated upstream from this
have the same degree of responsibility for the waste present in the segment
in question. However, this would only be \fair" if all regions have discharged
exactly the same quantity of waste of the one present in that segment, which is
not necessarily the case.
Overview of results In this paper, we seek to develop an alternative rule
to the methods proposed by Ni and Wang (2007) which takes into account
the responsibility of the regions for the presence of the waste. We explicitly
introduce into our model the fact that the waste is transferred, with the water,
from upstream to downstream at a particular rate, an idea that is implicitly
assumed in Ni and Wang (2007). If the social planner knew this rate, she could
use the cost vector to accurately calculate the amount of waste discharged by
each region into the river, and the costs could thus be distributed according
to their actual responsibilities. However, in practice, the transfer rate may be
unknown.2 In that case, we show that the social planner could estimate certain
limits of that rate from the cost vector. Those limits provide useful information
for distributing the costs fairly, since they enable certain limits of responsibility
to be inferred for each region. We show that the rules that naturally adapt
the methods proposed by Ni and Wang (2007) do not always assign costs in
the intervals constructed with these limits, thus violating this basic principle of
fairness.
We introduce a set of desirable properties taking into account this information
concerning the responsibility of each region in discharging the waste. Those
properties are: (i) Limits of Responsibility, which requires the cost paid by each
region for cleaning its own segment always to be within its limits of responsi-
bility; (ii) No Downstream Responsibility, which states that a region j situated
downstream from another region i has no responsibility for the waste present in
i and therefore does not have to pay anything towards the cost of cleaning it up;
2This uncertainty about the transfer rate is usually assumed in the literature on non-point
source pollution (see Segerson (1988)).
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(iii) Consistent Responsibility, which ensures that the part of the cost of clean-
ing a segment paid by one region relative to the part paid by another region is
consistent throughout all the segments situated downstream from both regions;
and (iv) Monotonicity with respect to Information on the Transfer Rate, which
states that when information on the transfer rate improves in such a way that it
becomes natural to induce a higher (lower) estimated value for the real transfer
rate, the amount of waste in any segment for which all its upstream regions are
responsible must not be lower (higher) than before.
That set of properties characterize a new cost allocation rule, the Upstream
Responsibility rule, which works as follows: rst, it assigns to the region situated
in a given segment the value of its responsibility taking as the transfer rate the
mid-point in the interval between its lower and its higher limits. The remaining
cost of cleaning the segment in question is divided among the upstream regions,
maintaining the proportions of the allocation of the cost of cleaning the previous
segment.
Related literature The study of allocation problems using game theoretical
and/or axiomatic models to solve issues related to transboundary rivers has
developed in two directions. On the one hand (the harmful side) some authors
have developed models for studying how to share the costs of cleaning a river
among the regions located along it. On the other hand (the benecial side)
some papers have analyzed models for determining how to share water resources
among the dierent regions along a river.
Among the papers dealing with the harmful side, which is the body of litera-
ture into which our paper ts, there are two main approaches. Several papers,
starting with Ni and Wang (2007) and including ours, consider a river as a seg-
ment divided into dierent regions and assume that the cost of cleaning each
region is exogenously given. Along these lines, Ni and Wang (2007) propose
and characterize the two methods - Local Responsibility Sharing and Upstream
Equal Sharing - described above. They also defend these methods as the Shap-
ley values of two appropriately dened TU games and as solutions belonging to
the core of this problem. Van den Brink and van der Laan (2008) show that
these additional results are particularizations of certain well-known results of
cooperative game theory (in particular, the problem is essentially an airport
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cost game, see Littlechild and Owen (1973)) and they provide an alternative ax-
iomatic characterization of these methods. This model is extended by Dong et
al. (2012) by considering a river as a network. Based on a dierent principle (the
\polluter-pays" principle), Gomez-Rua (2013) denes water taxes according to
regions' responsibilities for pollution and characterizes several cost allocation
methods based on properties of those taxes. Other papers such as Gengenbach
et al. (2010) and van der Laan and Moes (2012) take a substantially dierent
approach by assuming that the cost allocation method adopted may aect the
decision of each region about how much waste to discharge.
On the benecial side, papers generally analyze water allocation problems and
the fair distribution of the welfare resulting from distributing the water of a
river among dierent regions. Based on cooperative game theory, Ambec and
Sprumont (2002) model this situation by dening a coalitional form game. They
analyze how water should be allocated across the agents and propose what mon-
etary transfers should be made. Along these lines, Ambec and Ehlers (2008)
generalize the aforesaid model by allowing for satiable agents. Wang (2011),
using a similar model but with a market-based approach, analyzes ecient allo-
cations when trade is restricted to neighboring agents along the river. Khmel-
nitskaya (2010), and van den Brink et al. (2012) extend the previous models by
considering rivers with multiple springs.3 Rebille and Richefort (2012) analyze
the problem of water allocation from a non-cooperative point of view.
Remainder The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
the basic model, adapts the existing solutions of the literature to our framework
and introduces a result that shows that the cost vector can provide useful in-
formation worth considering when constructing a cost allocation rule based on
responsibility. Section 3 discusses some axioms for cost allocation rules reecting
basic ideas of responsibility, denes the Upstream Responsibility rule, provides
a characterization of it based on the axioms dened previously and compares
it with the other solutions. Section 4 contains several extensions of the basic
model covering more complex situations and, nally, Section 5 concludes. The
Appendix contains the proofs of the results.
3For more details on the use of cooperative game theory to model water allocation problems,
readers are referred to any of the numerous surveys on the matter. See for instance, Beal et
al. (2013), Beard (2011) and Parrachino et al. (2006).
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2 The basic model
Notation and denitions
Consider a river which is divided into n segments of the same size from upstream
to downstream. There is a set of regions, each of which is located in one of the
segments, which have discharged waste into the river.4 This river has a transfer
rate t that measures the proportion of waste that is transferred from one segment
of the river to the next. This transfer rate may not be exactly known. Consider
a general case in which the social planner knows that t is situated within an
interval [t; t], where t 2 [0; 1) and t 2 (0; 1].5 Cases in which t = t are situations
in which the social planner knows the actual transfer rate, while the cases in
which t = 0 and t = 1 are situations in which there is no information at all
about t.
There is a central agency that determines the cost of cleaning the river in each
segment. We assume that this cost is exactly the amount of waste present in
the segment in question.6 The agency has to allocate the costs of the cleaning
process to the dierent regions in a fair way. Our main objective is to nd rules
for allocating those costs in a way that reects the responsibility of each region
in the discharging of the waste.
Formally, let N = f1; :::; ng  N be a nite set of regions such that i is situated
upstream of i + 1 for all i 2 f1; : : : ; n   1g. Let C = (c1; :::; cn) 2 Rn+ be the
cleaning cost vector, where ci represents the cost incurred to clean the river in
region i. Then, a cost allocation problem is a tuple (N;C; t; t).7
4To make the results clearer, we start in the basic model with the strong assumption that
all segments are the same size. In Section 4 we explain how the results can be generalized to
cover the cases in which the segments may be of dierent sizes.
5We exclude from the basic analysis the extreme cases in which either t = 0 or t = 1.
Similarly, this basic model assumes a uniform transfer rate along the river. We explain in
Section 4 how the results can be adapted when these assumptions are dropped.
6This assumption is made for the sake of uency. We could have assumed instead that the
cost of cleaning each segment is an increasing linear function of the amount of waste present
in it, without essentially altering the results.
7A problem can also be dened by a triple (C; t; t) given that the information on N is
included in C. However, we prefer to maintain both to be consistent with the notation used
by Ni and Wang (2007).
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A cost allocation rule is a mapping x that assigns to each problem (N;C; t; t)
a matrix of size n  n, (xji )i;j2N (N;C; t; t) such that all its components are
non{negative and
P
i2N
xji (N;C; t; t) = cj . With this interpretation, x
j
i (N;C; t; t)
represents the part of the cost of cleaning segment j that region i pays. When
there is no risk of confusion about the description of the problem, we will only
write xji (). We will denote by xi(N;C; t; t) the total cost allocated to region
i by the rule x in the problem (N;C; t; t); i.e. xi(N;C; t; t) =
P
j2N
xji (). Note
that the denition of a rule implies that
P
i2N
xi() =
P
i2N
ci.
8 A dierent solution
concept to cost allocation problems that was proposed by Ni and Wang (2007)
and also studied by van den Brink and van der Laan (2008) is a cost allocation
method. This solution concept is a function x that assigns to each cost allocation
problem (N;C; t; t) the vector (xi(N;C; t; t))i2N 2 Rn+; i.e. the total cost that
each region pays for cleaning the entire river.9
The LRS and UES rules
In this subsection we discuss the solutions proposed by Ni and Wang (2007) and
also studied by van den Brink and van der Laan (2008): the Local Responsibility
Sharing method, x, dened by xi(N;C; t; t) = ci for all i 2 N ; and the Upstream
Equal Sharing method, x^, dened by x^i(N;C; t; t) =
P
ji
cj
j for all i 2 N .
A cost allocation method is a less precise solution concept than a cost allocation
rule given that the latter also makes it explicit how the total cost that each
region pays to clean the entire river is attributed to each segment of the river
(i.e. how each xi() is decomposed into xji () for each j). We consider that a
cost allocation rule is not only more informative but is also a better solution
concept if the social planner decides to take into account the responsibility
held by each region for the discharging of the waste present in each segment
of the river. This is because a cost allocation rule explains explicitly how the
cost of cleaning each segment has to be shared (i.e. how each cj is allocated
8This condition is imposed in the studies of Ni and Wang (2007) and van den Brink and
van der Laan (2008) as an axiom called Eciency. We consider that this property should be
included in the denition of a rule.
9Notice that, as mentioned in the Introduction, these papers do not explicitly consider
information about the transfer rate (t and t). However, we prefer to maintain it in the
denition of their framework to highlight the main dierence between the solution concepts.
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to xji () for each i). Note that each cost allocation method, and x and x^ in
particular, corresponds to multiple cost allocation rules. It could be argued
that this makes it hard to compare these solutions to those formulated in terms
of cost allocation rules. Thus, it is convenient to determine a matching between
each of those method and a particular rule. To that end, we adapt the set of
axioms that characterize each method to the case of cost allocation rules and
are able to isolate one particular rule for each particular method. We use the
characterizations proposed by van den Brink and van der Laan (2008).10
The rst axiom is No Blind Cost, which states that the total cost paid by a
region in which there is no waste should be zero. We maintain this property
invariant with respect to its original version.
No Blind Cost (NBC): For all problems (N;C; t; t) and all i 2 N such that
ci = 0,
xi() = 0:
The second property is Cost Symmetry, which states that region i and all its
upstream regions should pay the same total cost if there is no waste in any
segment upstream from i. We adapt the property to our framework by requiring
not only that the total cost paid by each of these regions should be the same,
but also its decomposition in terms of each segment.
Cost Symmetry (CS): For all problems (N;C; t; t) and all i; j; k 2 N such that
j; k  i and ck = 0 for all k < i,
xlj() = xlk() for all l 2 N:
The third and last property needed for these characterizations is Independence
of Upstream Costs, which states that the total cost paid by a region should
depend only on the waste present in its segment and in all the regions situ-
ated downstream from it. Similarly to CS, we also adapt this property to our
10Unlike those proposed by Ni and Wang (2007), the characterizations proposed by van den
Brink and van der Laan (2008) do not require an additivity property. They show that this
axiom becomes unnecessary for the characterizations when the set of the other properties is
slightly modied.
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framework by requiring not only that the total cost paid by each region be in-
dependent of the waste upstream from it, but also its decomposition in terms
of each segment.
Independence of Upstream Costs (IUC): For all problems (N;C; t; t) and
(N;C 0; t; t) and all i 2 N such that ch = c0h for all h > i,
xkj (N;C; t; t) = x
k
j (N;C
0; t; t) for all j; k 2 N such that j > i:
We consider that these additional requirements in CS and IUC appropriately
complement the original idea of the axioms when the solution concept adopted
is a cost allocation rule.
Now we introduce two cost allocation rules that are particular extensions of the
two methods proposed and studied by Ni and Wang (2007) and van den Brink
and van der Laan (2008).
Denition 1 The Local Responsibility Sharing (LRS) rule, , is given by
ji () =
(
0 if i 6= j
ci if i = j.
Denition 2 The Upstream Equal Sharing (UES) rule, , is given by
ji () =
(
0 if i > j
cj
j if i  j.
We show that these are the only cost allocation rules isolated by using the
natural adaptations of the axioms that characterize the original methods.11
Proposition 1 A cost allocation rule satises NBC and IUC if and only if it
is the Local Responsibility Sharing rule .
Proposition 2 A cost allocation rule satises CS and IUC if and only if it is
the Upstream Equal Sharing rule .
11The proofs, which can be found in the Appendix, follow the same arguments used by van
den Brink and van der Laan (2008).
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Limits of responsibility
We have assumed that the transfer rate t may be not totally known a priori
by the social planner. However, there is some information that can be deduced
from the cleaning cost vector. Let us rst explain this idea with an (extreme)
case: Consider a river with a cleaning cost vector such that c1 > 0, c2 = 0
and c3 > 0. On the one hand, the presence of waste in region 1 implies that
t 6= 1, since otherwise there would be no waste left in this segment and c1
would be 0. On the other hand, the absence of waste in region 2 implies that
t =2 (0; 1), because those values of the transfer rate jointly with the presence of
waste in region 1 would imply the presence of some waste in region 2 and c2
would be strictly positive. Thus, we say that the unique value for the transfer
rate compatible with this problem is 0.
In general, we say that a value t^ for the transfer rate is compatible with a cost
allocation problem if the amounts of waste present in each segment described
by the cost vector can occur given the value t^ for the transfer rate. Otherwise
we say that t^ is incompatible with the problem. The following proposition
determines what values for the transfer rate are compatible with each possible
cost allocation problem.
Proposition 3 A value t^ for the transfer rate is compatible with a cost alloca-
tion problem (N;C; t; t) if and only if t^ 2 [t; t(t; C)], where
t

(t; C) = min

min
i2f2;:::n 1g

ci
ci 1

;
cn
cn 1 + cn
; t

:12
This result allows us to reduce the uncertainty over the transfer rate. In partic-
ular, the cost vector C provides, jointly with t, a maximum limit for this rate
that we denote t

(t; C). To see the capacity of this result, consider the following
example.
Example 1 Suppose a problem in which N = f1; 2; 3; 4g, the cost vector is
C = f10; 16; 8; 24g and the social planner has no information a priori about the
12The possible quotients with the indeterminate form 0
0
have not to be considered in the
determination of t

(t; C). Obviously, t

(t; C) has to be not smaller than t because in other
case the problem (N;C; t; t) would not be well-dened.
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transfer rate, i.e. t = 0 and t = 1. Then, focusing on the costs of cleaning the
segments, the information about the transfer of the waste can be improved using
Proposition 3. In this case, we obtain that t(t; C) = minf 85 ; 12 ; 34 ; 1g. Therefore,
Proposition 3 indicates that the transfer rate is at most one half and, then, the
information about the transfer rate after observing the cost vector can be adapted.
Given a problem (N;C; t; t), we will denote by lji (N;C; t; t) the amount of waste
present in segment j that has been discharged by region i. When there is no
risk of confusion about the description of the problem, we simply write lji ().
When the actual transfer rate t is unknown, lji () cannot be precisely calculated.
However, some limits of this value can be deduced from the information about
the transfer rate held by the social planner and from what the planner can infer
from the cost vector via Proposition 3. We will denote the lower and higher
limits of lji () by lji () and l
j
i (), respectively. The following proposition will
provide formulas for lii() and l
i
i() for all i 2 N .13
Proposition 4 Let (N;C; t; t) be a problem. Then,
lii() =
8>>>><>>>>:
ci if i = 1
ci   ci 1  t(t; C) if i 2 f2; : : : ; n  1g
ci   ci 1t

(t;C)
1 t(t;C) if i = n and t

(t; C) < 1
0 if i = n and t

(t; C) = 1.
l
i
i() =
8>><>>:
ci if i = 1
ci   ci 1  t if i 2 f2; : : : ; n  1g
ci   ci 1t1 t if i = n
It is natural to require that any rule that seeks to allocate costs in terms of
each region's responsibility for producing the waste present in each segment
should always respect the limits calculated in Proposition 4 when the costs are
allocated. In the rest of this section, we discuss whether the LRS and UES rules
full this requirement.
On the one hand, the LRS rule meets the aforesaid requirement of responsibility
only when t = 0. However, it can only be accepted as a rule that allocates costs
13It is also possible, but extremely tedious, to construct formulas for the limits of any lji ()
in a similar way, but these ones are sucient for our purposes.
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taking responsibilities into account if the real transfer rate, t, is 0 in all rivers.
Nevertheless, this literature only makes sense when waste is transferred from
one region to another, an idea that is realistic. On the other hand, the following
example shows that, independently of the information about t (t and t), the UES
rule does not satisfy the requirement of allocating costs within the intervals of
responsibility dened in Proposition 4.
Example 2 Consider the family of cost allocation problems (N;C; t; t) such
that N = f1; 2; 3; 4g and C = f10; 16; 8; 24g. In all these problems, the UES rule
assigns to region 2 only half of the cost of cleaning its own segment; i.e. 22() =
8. However, given that t

(t; C)  12 , it is easy to calculate from Proposition 4
that l22()  11 for all possible values of t and t. Hence, region 2 should pay at
least 11 to clean its own segment if responsibilities are considered.
3 The Upstream Responsibility Rule
Axioms, denition and characterization
The axioms that we present for a rule are based on basic ideas about respon-
sibility for the waste present in the river channel. The rst axiom, Limits of
Responsibility, seeks to avoid the problem found in the LRS and UES rules
studied in the previous section. To that end, the property requires that the cost
paid by each region for cleaning its own segment should always be within the
limits calculated in Proposition 4.
Limits of Responsibility (LR): For all problems (N;C; t; t), and for all i 2 N ,
xii() 2 [lii(); l
i
i()].
The second axiom, No Downstream Responsibility, states that a region j located
downstream from another region i has no responsibility for the waste present in
i, and should therefore not pay any part of the cost of cleaning it up.
No Downstream Responsibility (NDR): For all problems (N;C; t; t) and all
i; j 2 N such that i < j, xij() = 0.
To introduce the next property, Consistent Responsibility, assume three regions
i, j and k such that i is located upstream from j and j upstream from k. A
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rule decides how the cost of cleaning the river in region j should be divided
among all the regions depending on their responsibility for the waste present in
this region. In particular, it establishes the responsibility of region i relative to
the responsibility of region j for producing that waste

xji ()
xjj()

. Observe that
part of the waste that has at some time entered j, which comprises the waste
discharged by j and some of the waste discharged by the regions upstream from
it including i, remains in j and part owed on to j+1. Given that regions i and
j do not produce any waste other than that which arrived at some time at j,
then the amount of waste that entered j+1 from j must contain the same ratio
of waste discharged by region i to waste discharged by region j as exists in the
waste present in j. By a similar argument, that ratio must also be maintained
in the amount of waste that remains in region j+1 and did not ow on to j+2.
Reasoning in the same way for the subsequent segments, it can be stated that
this ratio must be maintained for any downstream segment k. Thus, the axiom
states that the rule should establish the same degree of responsibility of region i
relative to the responsibility of region j for the waste present in region k

xki ()
xkj ()

as the relative responsibilities established for these regions in the waste present
in j. For example, if region i is responsible for twice as much waste as region
j in j

xji ()
xjj()
= 2

, the axiom establishes that region i is also responsible for
twice as much as region j in k

xki ()
xkj ()
= 2

. In general, the axiom establishes
that

xji ()
xjj()

should be equal to

xki ()
xkj ()

.14
Consistent Responsibility (CR): For all problems (N;C; t; t) and all i; j; k 2
N such that i < j < k,
xjj()  xki () = xkj ()  xji ():
The last property, Monotonicity with respect to Information on the Transfer
Rate, refers to situations in which, ceteris paribus, the information on the trans-
fer rate improves. Given a problem (N;C; t; t), it is known from Proposition 3
that the transfer rate t is within the interval [t; t

(t; C)]. Assume that informa-
tion on the transfer rate becomes more precise in such a way that some previ-
ous possible values of t can now be ruled out; that is, consider a new problem
14The axiom is not expressed in terms of these quotients but in terms of products so as to
avoid indeterminate forms.
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(N;C; u; u) such that [u; u(u;C)]  [t; t(t; C)]. If this informational improve-
ment is such that the values discarded are mainly from the lower (higher) part
of the interval [t; t

(t; C)], it would be natural to induce a not lower (not higher)
estimated value for the real transfer rate.15 Given that the cost vector is the
same, the quantity of waste in any segment for which responsibility lies with all
the upstream regions must be no lower (no higher) under the new estimation.
Therefore, the axiom requires that for any segment the total amount paid by
all its upstream regions for cleaning the segment in question should now be no
lower (no higher).
Monotonicity with respect to Information on the transfer rate (MIT):
For all problems (N;C; t; t) and (N;C; u; u) such that [u; u(u;C)]  [t; t(t; C)]
and for all j 2 N ,
u  t > t(t; C)  u(u;C))
X
i<j
xji (N;C; u; u) 
X
i<j
xji (N;C; t; t)
u  t < t(t; C)  u(u;C))
X
i<j
xji (N;C; u; u) 
X
i<j
xji (N;C; t; t):
Observe that the above list of axioms includes, on the one hand, a basic principle
of fairness in this context (LR) and, on the other hand, a set of three very
weak properties (NDR, CR and MIT) that are satised by many possible rules
which are very dierent one from another (for example, both  and  satisfy
them). However, as we are going to show, the addition of LR to these three
axioms isolates one new rule, the Upstream Responsibility rule. We begin by
presenting it in an intuitive way. To assign the total cost of cleaning each
segment i, this rule rst imputes to the region situated in that segment the
value of its responsibility obtained from Proposition 4 taking as the transfer
rate the mid-point in the interval between t and t

(t; C). The remaining cost,
if any, is allocated to the upstream regions in line with the proportions applied
in the allocation of the cost of the previous segment. The formal denition of
the rule is as follows.
15This deduction makes sense if the uncertainty of the social planner on the transfer rate
takes the form of a symmetric random variable (for example, a uniform distribution). More
general cases are analyzed in Section 4.
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Denition 3 The Upstream Responsibility rule, , is given by:
ji (N;C; t; t) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>:
0 if i > j,
ci  sj i   ci 1  sj+1 i if i  j < n,
ci   ci 1s1 s if i = j = n,
cisj i ci 1sj+1 i
1 s if i < j = n,
where s = t+t

(t;C)
2 , c0 is set to 0 and the indeterminate form 0
0 is set to 1.
The Upstream Responsibility rule is based on the responsibility of the agents
involved in discharging waste into a river. In particular, if the social planner
knows the actual transfer rate (t = t

(t; C) = t), it can be shown that this
rule establishes that the total cost that each region has to pay to clean the
entire river exactly matches the total quantity of waste that it has discharged,
which can be deduced from the cost vector. To express it formally, we have
that the quantity of waste discharged by a region i, that we denote by Vi,
can be deduced observing t and C. This amount of waste Vi(t; C) is exactly
the total cost that region i pays under the Upstream Responsibility rule. If,
however, there is uncertainty over the transfer rate, the rule assigns to each
region the total cost corresponding to the amount of waste that it is considered
to have discharged, using s = t+t

(t;C)
2 as the estimated value of the transfer
rate. That is, it assigns Vi(s; C) to each region i. In other words, the cost
allocation method corresponding to the Upstream Responsibility rule (which is
uniquely determined and will be called the Upstream Responsibility method)
assigns a distribution equal to the responsibility of each region, using s as the
estimated transfer rate.
Proposition 5 Let (N;C; t; t) be a cost allocation problem. Then, the Upstream
Responsibility method   is
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 i(N;C; t; t) = Vi(s; C) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
ci
1 s if i = 1,
ci
1 s   ci 1s1 s if i 2 f2; : : : ; n  1g,
ci   ci 1s1 s if i = n,
where s = t+t

(t;C)
2 .
The following result states that the Upstream Responsibility rule is character-
ized by the combination of the four axioms introduced above.
Theorem 1 A rule satises LR, NDR, CR and MIT if and only if it is the
Upstream Responsibility rule .
We also show that this characterization is tight.
Proposition 6 Axioms LR, NDR, CR and MIT are independent.
A comparison with the LRS and UES solutions
In Section 2 we have constructed cost allocation rules that maintain the spirit
of the LRS and UES methods. In order to avoid the problems detected in those
rules, we have dened and characterized a new rule: the Upstream Respon-
sibility rule. In this subsection, we discuss the dierences between the three
solutions. First, to illustrate how the three rules behave, we apply them to a
particular cost allocation problem.
Example 3 Consider again the cost allocation problem dened in Example 1,
where N = f1; 2; 3; 4g, C = f10; 16; 8; 24g, t = 0, t = 1 and t(t; C) = 12 . On the
one hand, the solutions proposed to this problem by  and  are, respectively:
() =
0BBBB@
10 0 0 0
0 16 0 0
0 0 8 0
0 0 0 24
1CCCCA
16
() =
0BBBB@
10 8 83 6
0 8 83 6
0 0 83 6
0 0 0 6
1CCCCA :
On the other hand, the Upstream Responsibility rule assigns to this problem the
following solution:
() =
0BBBB@
10 52
5
8
5
24
0 272
27
8
9
8
0 0 4 43
0 0 0 643
1CCCCA :
To discuss the dierences between all these rules, we use their axiomatic decom-
positions. Consider rst the new rule, . It is characterized by the combination
of four properties: one based on the responsibilities inferred from the cost vec-
tor, LR, and three more basic properties (NDR, CR and MIT). As mentioned
above,  and  satisfy all these properties except LR. Hence, the property LR
is the source of the discrepancies between our proposal  and the other two
proposals,  and . This is because LR compels us to consider the information
that can be inferred from the cost vector about the responsibility of each region
in producing the waste.
Another way to see this divergence between the rules is to focus on the charac-
terizations of  and . Remember that  is characterized by a combination of
NBC and IUC, while  is characterized by IUC and CS. However, our rule only
satises NBC. Again, this happens because the other two properties ignore the
information that can be inferred from the cost vector about responsibilities. In
particular,  does not satisfy IUC because the estimated responsibility of region
i for waste in the river is not totally independent of the waste present in the
regions upstream from it: the waste in region i  1 gives important information
about the amount of waste that passed on to region i from its upstream regions
and, therefore,  takes it into account in estimating responsibilities. Similarly,
 does not satisfy CS because the responsibilities for the waste present in a
segment are not symmetric across all its upstream regions: the cost vector gives
information about these heterogeneous responsibilities that  takes into account.
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Besides comparing our cost allocation rule with the LRS and UES ones, we
could compare their associated cost allocation methods directly. This analysis
is important since, theoretically, it could happen that a cost allocation rule
does not satisfy a particular property but its associated method does satisfy
the adapted axiom for cost allocation methods. In the case of the Upstream
Responsibility method, we can analyze whether or not it satises the original
axioms that characterize the LRS and UES methods. It can be seen that it
satises the original NBC axiom, but it does not satisfy the original IUC and
CS properties for the same reasons expressed in the previous paragraph, so the
direct analysis of our method does not dier in this aspect from the analysis of
the rule. Unfortunately, since there is no direct way of adapting our new axioms
for cost allocation methods, we cannot evaluate any method, and in particular
the LRS and UES ones, on the basis of these properties.
4 Extensions of the basic model and related prob-
lems
We have shown that given a transboundary river with waste transfer, the costs
of cleaning each region provide information about the responsibility of each one
for producing the waste which can be used to construct a new cost allocation
rule. To infer this information, we have followed a simplied model that has
enabled us to obtain results in a simple manner. Although such a model may
seem too simple to be applied to real cost allocation problems, it is not dicult
to extend it to more general situations. Some of those extensions are discussed
below, with an explanation of how the axioms and results can be adapted.
We also include a subsection discussing an interesting dual problem to the one
studied in this paper and how our results can be adapted to it.16
Extensions on the denition of the segments
One of the assumptions of the basic model is that a river is divided into segments
of the same size. A river with segments of dierent sizes could be posited to
reect the fact that regions can occupy dierent extensions along a river. We
can analyze this more general case from our framework by associating a cost
16We thank two anonymous referees for drawing our attention to some of these topics.
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allocation problem in which segments have dierent sizes with a new problem
in which all segments have the same size. The number of segments in this
new problem should be the total length of the river divided by the maximum
common divisor of the lengths of all regions in the original problem. Formally,
let (N;C; l; t; t) be an extended cost allocation problem in which N , C, t and
t have the same meaning as in the basic model and l 2 Rn++ describes the
(possibly dierent) lengths of each region. Then, the associated problem has a
set of segments N with cardinality jNj =
P
i2N
li
mcd(l) , where mcd(l) refers to the
maximum common divisor of the values of l. In this way, each region i 2 N is
associated with a set of segments in the new problem fi1; : : : ; ikg  N, with
k = limcd(l) . The cost vector C
 of the associated problem has to satisfy that
ci =
kP
j=1
cij . Thus, using this strategy, we construct an associated problem
(N; C; t; t) to (N;C; l; t; t).17 Now, given that all segments in the problem
(N; C; t; t) are of the same size, this associated problem is included in the
domain of our basic model and, therefore, our results would imply the use of
the  rule to assign the costs. We can thus use this solution to dene an
assignment for the original problem by allocating to each region i 2 N the sum
of the costs allocated by  to each of the segments in the associated problem:
kP
j=1
ij (N
; C; t; t).
An interesting aspect of this extension that deserves more discussion is the
distribution of the cost over the subsegments of a particular region. Although
there is only one way of constructing N from N , there are many dierent
ways of constructing C from C. In contexts in which the social planner has
information about the waste present in each subsegment of a region, it suces to
apply  and there is no room for further research. However, if the social planner
only knows the total cost of cleaning the entire region i but is unaware of how
it breaks down by subsegments, the precise distribution of ci into ci1 ; : : : ; cik
could be relevant in the nal allocation selected by the rule. We illustrate this
with the following simple example.
Example 4 Consider the extended cost allocation problem (N;C; l; t; t) such
that N = f1; 2; 3g, C = f10; 16; 24g, l2 = 2l1 = 2l3, t = 0 and t = 25 . Thus,
17The meaning of upstream and downstream in N is similar than in N : ih is upstream
from jm if i < j or if i = j and h < m.
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a new problem must be considered in which region 2 is decomposed into two
subsegments, 21 and 22, in such a way that all subsegments are the same size.
Then, c2 must also be broken down into c21 and c22 and we have to work with
the problems (f11; 21; 22; 31g; (10; c21 ; c22 ; 24); 0; 25 ) such that c21 + c22 = 16. If
the cost of cleaning region 2 is decomposed such that c21 = c22 = 8, then the
total cost that region 2 pays to clean the entire river by applying  is 15:5, while
if the decomposition is c21 = 4 and c22 = 12, it is 16:5.
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Example 4 points out the importance of having the most disaggregated data
possible on the waste present in each segment of the river. If the social planner
has no access to such data then, as this example shows, the regions could have
incentives to misrepresent them.
Another natural extension of our model is to consider a river which is not a
segment but a network divided into segments. This could be useful in modeling
a river with tributaries and/or forks. In that case, all the results of the paper
can be easily adapted by incorporating the number of outlets on each fork into
the calculation of the limits of the transfer rate and extending the rule as Dong
et al. (2012) extend the methods of Ni and Wang (2007).19
Extensions on the values of t and t
We have assumed t 2 [0; 1) and t 2 (0; 1] in our basic model, thus excluding
the cases in which the social planner knows for certain that the actual transfer
rate is 0 (t = 0) and those in which she knows that the actual transfer rate is
1 (t = 1). Although these are extreme cases without much practical relevance,
the results of the basic model can also be applied to them after some details are
considered.
Cases in which the social planner knows that there is no transfer of waste be-
tween two adjacent regions (t = 0) can be included in our basic model without
changes, keeping the axioms and the characterization result invariant. Observe
that in these extreme cases the Upstream Responsibility rule assigns the cost
18Notice that Proposition 3 implies a maximum limit for t of 2
5
for both decompositions.
However, other decompositions might aect this maximum limit, biasing also the allocation
selected.
19More details on this extension can be provided upon request.
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of cleaning each segment entirely to the region located there, thus coinciding in
such cases with the LRS rule.
With respect to the cases in which the social planner knows that all the waste
that enters a region is transferred to the next downstream region (t = 1), observe
that they are compatible only with cost vectors C such that ci = 0 for all
i < n.20 In such cases no information can be deduced from the cost vector to
infer responsibilities for the waste present in the last region, cn. Thus, sharing
this cost equally among all regions could be a reasonable possibility.
Consider the extended domain that includes these extreme cases; that is, the
domain of all cost allocation problems (N;C; t; t), where N = f1; : : : ; ng  N,
C 2 Rn+, t; t 2 [0; 1] with t  t. Our characterization result can be extended to
this extended domain by adding a new property to the axioms of Theorem 1.
This property is Weak Cost Symmetry, which applies the spirit of CS only to ex-
treme cases in which there is total uncertainty about which region is responsible
for each unit of waste.
Weak Cost Symmetry (WCS): For all problems (N;C; 1; 1) and all j; k 2 N
such that ck = 0 for all k < n,
xlj() = xlk() for all l 2 N:
The introduction of WCS implies that the rule must coincide with the UES rule
for the extreme cases in which t = 1. The Upstream Responsibility rule can be
therefore extended for this domain in the following way:
Denition 4 The Extended Upstream Responsibility rule,  , is given by
 ji () =
8>><>>:
ji () if t 2 [0; 1) and t 2 (0; 1]
ji () = ji () if t = 0
ji () if t = 1.
The general characterization can then be presented for this extension.21
20Note that these cost vectors are also compatible with other values of the transfer rate.
21The proof is straightforward using Theorem 1 for all the natural cases, applying LR to
the extreme cases of t = 0 (in which lii() = l
i
i() = ci) and applying WCS to the extreme
cases in which t = 1. We therefore omit it.
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Theorem 2 A rule satises LR, NDR, CR, MIT and WCS if and only if it is
the Extended Upstream Responsibility rule  .
Extension on the structure of the transfer rate
We have also assumed in the basic model that the transfer rate is uniform along
the river. A possible extension of the model in regard to this assumption is to
consider that the transfer rate changes in some areas of the river. This could be
useful in modeling rivers that run through regions with dierent types of terrain,
weather or biosystems. In such cases the model could be adapted by dividing
the problem into subproblems with homogeneous characteristics. By applying
Proposition 3 to each of them, dierent limits can be deduced for each particular
transfer rate. Additionally, new limits can be deduced with the information of
the entire river.
Below, we explain how the limits of each transfer rate must be calculated and,
as a result, how the Upstream Responsibility rule is adapted in this extended
model for a particular case.
Consider the cost allocation problems with ve regions such that the terrain
is homogeneous in the transitions from regions 1 to 3 and in the transitions
from regions 3 to 5, but is dierent in these two parts. These problems can be
formulated using two transfer rates: t, which measures the proportion of waste
transferred from one segment to the next between segments 1 and 2 and between
segments 2 and 3, and u, which does the same from segment 3 to 4 and from
4 to 5. Thus, the cost allocation problems are dened as (Nt; Nu; C; t; t; u; u),
where Nt = f1; 2; 3g and Nu = f3; 4; 5g specify between the segments to which
each of the transfer rates (t and u, respectively) apply. In such cases, following
arguments similar to those in Proposition 3, an upper limit for u is obtained
with the same form as in the basic case:
u(u;C) = minfc4
c3
;
c5
c4 + c5
; ug:
The upper limit for t is also similar to that in the basic model, but here a new
restriction can be established for it based on the information for region 3, where
the two transfer rates interact:22
22The proof of all the arguments of this subsection follows a similar path to the proofs of
the basic model and can be found in Appendix B (Supplementary Material).
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t

(u; t; C) = minfc2
c1
; t; h(u(u;C))g;
where h(u) = c3c3+c2(1 u) .
Additionally, this new interaction enables a lower limit for u to be introduced:
u(u; t; C) = maxfh 1(t); ug:
Thus, in this extended model the results of Proposition 4 could be adapted
according to the information about the transfer rates, adapting also axiom LR.
On the other hand, axioms NDR and CR need no adaptation in this context,
while MIT has to be applied to the information on both transfer rates. As a
result, the characterized rule for these problems uses the values s = t+t

(u;t;C)
2
and v = u
(u;t;C)+u(u;C)
2 to estimate the transfer rates t and u, respectively, and
considers them in allocating costs in a way similar to that in the basic model:
s is used for transfers between segments upstream from 3 and v for transfers
downstream from 3. The formal denition of the rule for the ve player case is
as follows:
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ji (Nt; Nu; C; t; t; u; u) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
0 if i > j,
ci  sj i   ci 1  sj+1 i if i; j 2 f1; 2g and i  j,
cisj i(1 v) ci 1sj+1 i(1 v)
1 s if i < j and j = 3,
ci  vj i   ci 1  s1 s  (1  v)  vj i if i = 3 and j 2 f3; 4g,
ci   ci 1  v if i = j = 4,
cisj i 1(1 v)v ci 1sj i(1 v)v
1 s if i 2 f1; 2g and j = 4:
ci   ci 1v1 v if i = j = 5,
civ ci 1v2
1 v if i = 4 and j = 5,
ci  vj i1 v   ci 1  s1 s  vj i if i = 3 and j = 5,
ci(sj i 2v2) ci 1(sj i 1v2)
1 s if i 2 f1; 2g and j = 5,
where c0 is set to 0 and the indeterminate form 0
0 is set to 1.
Extension on the information about the transfer rate
Another implicit assumption of the basic model is that the uncertainty of the
social planner on the transfer rate takes the form of a symmetric random variable
(for example, a uniform distribution) on the interval [t; t

(t; C)], so the mean
value between t and t

(t; C) is always a good estimator of t. However, other
distributions that are not symmetric may be assumed a priori and, axiom MIT
would have to be reformulated to adapt our results to those cases. To be more
precise, a modied version of MIT would have to be considered in which the
changes in the intervals are evaluated on the basis not of their lengths but their
masses of probability of the specic random variable assumed. As a result, the
characterized rule would change to one in which the transfer rate considered in
allocating costs is the expected value of the random variable. This process is
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explained below for the case of any arbitrary continuous variable.
Consider the cost allocation problems dened by 5 tuples (N;C; t; t; f(t)) such
that the information of the social planner about t takes the form of a random
variable with density function f(t) with support in [t; t

(t; C)]. In this extended
model, axiom MIT is thus formulated as follows:
Monotonicity with respect to Information on the transfer rate (MIT):
For all problems (N;C; t; t; f(t)) and (N;C; u; u; g(u)) such that [u; u(u;C)] 
[t; t

(t; C)] and f(t) truncated at [u; u(u;C)] is equal to g(u) 23 and for all
j 2 N ,
F (u) > 1  F (u(u;C)))
X
i<j
xji (N;C; u; u) 
X
i<j
xji (N;C; t; t)
F (u) < 1  F (u(u;C)))
X
i<j
xji (N;C; u; u) 
X
i<j
xji (N;C; t; t);
where F is the cumulative distribution function corresponding to f .
Using this new general formulation of axiom MIT and maintaining the other
axioms as in the basic model, the characterized rule is found to have exactly
the same structure as in the basic case, except that the value of the parameter
s in the formula of  is equal to the expected value of t: s =
R t(t;C)
t
t  f(t)dt.
A dual problem
We have studied a model in which there is already waste in a river and the
clean-up costs have to be shared. However, there are situations in which certain
identied polluters produce most of the residues and, in such cases, the social
planner may be interested in implementing preventive policies to avoid subse-
quent problems. These policies may consist of giving such polluters incentives
to reduce their levels of pollution. For instance, some public agencies have in-
troduced contracts in which farmers commit to reducing their levels of pollution
in return for a payment from the agencies (see also Barrett, 1994).24
23That is, g(u) =
f(u)I[u;u(u;C)](u)
F (u(u;C)) F (u) , where F is the cumulative distribution function cor-
responding to f and I[u;u(u;C)](u) = 1 if u 2 [u; u(u;C)] and 0 otherwise.
24More recently, the OECD has also argued that it is necessary to assess the eciency and
eectiveness of water pollution abatement measures in the context of river basin management
(OECD, 2008).
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The model studied in this paper so far assumes that polluting regions must be
required to pay a cost for their activities, but this other framework implicitly
assumes that they have the right to pollute the water and must be compensated
for not doing so. As a result, the question of where the necessary funds should
come from is dual to the question of who has to pay the clean-up costs in the
other cases. Thus, in these cases, the social planner should allocate the costs
of the incentive program to the regions situated downstream from the polluter,
which will be the beneciaries of the pollution abatement.
The dual problem can be dened starting with a polluted river, dened as in
our basic model (N;C; t; t), where C represents the amount of waste present in
each segment. Consider also that there is an identied polluter in region k 2 N
that will receive a payment of z from the social planner if it reduces its pollution
emissions by z units. The dual problem is thus dened as (N;C; t; t; k; z) and the
adapted denition of a rule for these problems is a function x that assigns to each
problem a matrix (xji ())i;j2N of non{negative numbers such that
P
i2N
xki () = z
and
P
i2N
xji () = 0 for all j 6= k.
To construct a rule, dual axioms to those proposed in our basic model can be
used, with all references to upstream regions being replaced by downstream
ones (and vice versa) in such a way that regions pay in line with how much less
waste they will have in their respective segments with the incentive program.
For example, axiom NDR would be substituted by a dual property, which can be
called No Upstream Beneciary, stating that no region situated upstream from
k should pay any part of the program because they will not benet from it. The
other axioms can be adapted similarly and, as a result, the characterized rule
, which can be called Downstream Beneciary rule, is dual to the Upstream
Responsibility rule :
ji (N;C; t; t; k; z) =
8>><>>:
0 if j 6= k,
ij(N;C;t;t)
j(N;C;t;t)
 z if j = k.
The interpretation of this rule for assigning the costs of the incentive program
is also dual to the interpretation of the Upstream Responsibility rule. It assigns
a total cost to each region equal to the amount of pollution that would be
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eliminated in that region if the polluter is paid to discharge less waste. In cases
in which this amount cannot be precisely calculated because there is uncertainty
over t, the rule uses the estimated transfer rate s = t+t

(t;C)
2 .
The reasoning behind the formal denition of the rule is simple. The proportion
of waste discharged by region k that ends up in region i can be estimated using
the Upstream Responsibility rule by quotient
ik(N;C;t;t)
k(N;C;t;t)
. Thus, if the quantity
discharged by k is reduced by z units thanks to the incentive, it is reasonable
for region i to pay exactly that proportion of the program.
5 Concluding remarks
The presence of waste in rivers produces environmental problems and the costs
of solving them may be quite high. In cases in which dierent municipalities,
regions or even countries share a river, it is obvious that each region is not
totally responsible for all the waste in its own segment, and it therefore seems
desirable from a social point of view for these costs to be shared between all
the regions responsible. This paper studies the possibility of constructing a
rule for allocating those costs in line with the responsibilities of the regions for
producing the waste. We have shown that the solutions previously proposed
in the literature do not satisfy this objective because they fail to consider the
information about the transfer rate that can be deduced from the cleaning cost
vector. Additionally, we have provided normative foundations for the use of the
new Upstream Responsibility rule to allocate such costs with this objective.
An interesting problem for further research would be to study how the imple-
mentation of this cost allocation rule can aect the incentives for agents to
decide how much waste to discharge. This could be important because the op-
timal rule should incorporate not only a fair allocation of the costs for cleaning
up the waste in the river but also incentives for establishing an equilibrium with
less waste.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
First, it is easy to see that the LRS rule  satises NBC and IUC. To prove the
other implication, consider a problem (N;C; t; t) and let x be a cost allocation
rule that satises NBC and IUC. We will show that x equals .
Let f(N;Ck; t; t)gk2N be a sequence of cost allocation problems such that cki = 0
for all i < k and cki = ci for all i  k. Consider rst the problem (N;Cn; t; t).
By NBC we have that xji (N;C
n; t; t) = 0 for all i; j 2 N such that i < n.
Given that cnj = 0 for all j < n, we also have that x
j
n(N;C
n; t; t) = 0 for
all j < n. Therefore, the unique possibility by the denition of a rule is that
xnn(N;C
n; t; t) = cn.
Now, the proof follows by induction. Assume that we have determined the
solution for each problem (N;Ck; t; t) with k  j + 1 of the sequence and the
resulting allocations for these problems are xii(N;C
k; t; t) = ci for all i  k
and xli(N;C
k; t; t) = 0 for the remaining elements of the matrix. We have
to determine the solution for the j th problem of the sequence, (N;Cj ; t; t).
First, by NBC we have that xli(N;C
j ; t; t) = 0 for all i; l 2 N such that i < j.
Secondly, by IUC and the induction hypothesis we have that xii(N;C
j ; t; t) = ci
and xli(N;C
j ; t; t) = 0 for all i; l 2 N such that i > j. Then, the unique
possibility to satisfy the denition of a rule is that xjj(N;C
j ; t; t) = cj and
xlj(N;C
j ; t; t) = 0 for all l 6= j. Therefore, we have determined the complete
solution for the j-th problem of the sequence.
It is easy to see that the last problem of the sequence (N;C1; t; t) corresponds
with (N;C; t; t) and that the solution deduced by this induction argument cor-
responds to the solution of the  rule.
Proof of Proposition 2
First, it is easy to see that the UES rule  satises CS and IUC. To prove the
other implication, consider a problem (N;C; t; t) and let x be a cost allocation
rule that satises CS and IUC. We will show that x equals .
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Let f(N;Ck; t; t)gk2N be a sequence of cost allocation problems such that cki = 0
for all i < k and cki = ci for all i  k. Consider rst the problem (N;Cn; t; t).
By CS we have that xli(N;C
n; t; t) = xlj(N;C
n; t; t) for all i; j; l 2 N . Then, we
can deduce that xni (N;C
n; t; t) = cnn and x
l
i(N;C
n; t; t) = 0 for all i 2 N and
l < n. As a result, we have determined the complete solution for the problem
(N;Cn; t; t).
Now, the proof follows by induction. Assume that we have determined the solu-
tion for each problem (N;Ck; t; t) with k  j+1 of the sequence and the resulting
allocations for these problems are xli(N;C
k; t; t) = cll if (i  l and l  k) and
xli(N;C
k; t; t) = 0 otherwise. We have to determine the solution for the j th
problem of the sequence, (N;Cj ; t; t). First, by IUC and the induction hypoth-
esis we have that for all i > j, xli(N;C
j ; t; t) = cll if i  l and xli(N;Cj ; t; t) = 0
otherwise. Secondly, by CS we have that xli(N;C
j ; t; t) = xlk(N;C
j ; t; t) for all
i; k  j and all l 2 N . Then, we can deduce that xli(N;Cj ; t; t) = cll for all i  l
and l  j and xli(N;Cj ; t; t) = 0 for all l < j. Therefore, we have determined
the complete solution for the j-th problem of the sequence.
It is easy to see that the last problem of the sequence (N;C1; t; t) corresponds
with (N;C; t; t) and that the solution deduced by this induction argument cor-
responds to the solution of the  rule.
Proof of Proposition 3
Let (N;C; t; t) be a problem. For any segment i 2 N n fng, the cost that we
observe, ci, is the dierence between all the waste entering the segment, denoted
as V i ; and the amount transferred to the next segments, given by tV

i . Then,
ci = V

i   tV i for all i 2 f1; : : : ; n   1g. If the actual transfer rate t is 1, we
have that ci = 0 for all i 2 f1; : : : ; n  1g and t = 1. Therefore, t(t; C) = 1 and
the proposition is proved for that case.
Let us assume now that t < 1. Given that the waste cannot be transferred far
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from the most downstream region25, we have that cn = V

n . Then,
V i =
(
ci
1 t if i 2 f1; : : : ; n  1g
ci if i = n.
(1)
Let Vi be the amount of waste thrown into the water by region i. It is imme-
diate that Vi  V i given that upstream regions may transfer waste to region
i. In particular, the amount thrown into the water by region i is the dierence
between the total amount entered segment i and the amount transferred from
its immediate upstream segment. Then, for all i 2 f2; : : : ; ng, Vi = V i   tV i 1.
However, for i = 1, since there is no upstream region, V1 = V

1 . Then,
Vi =
(
V i if i = 1
V i   tV i 1 if i 2 f2; : : : ; ng.
(2)
Using expressions (1) and (2), we can obtain an expression of Vi in terms of C
and t:
Vi(t; C) =
8>><>>:
ci
1 t if i = 1
ci
1 t   ci 11 t t if i 2 f2; : : : ; n  1g
ci   ci 11 t t if i = n.
(3)
Given that Vi(t; C) is, by denition, non-negative and taking into account ex-
pression (3), the following conditions have to be satised:
 ci1 t   ci 11 t t  0 for all i 2 f2; : : : ; n  1g. If ci = ci 1 = 0, the condition is
always satised. Otherwise, we deduce that t  cici 1 for all i 2 f2; : : : ; n 
1g.
 cn   cn 11 t t  0. If ci = ci 1 = 0, the condition is always satised. Other-
wise, we deduce that t  cncn+cn 1 .
25Note that the fact that the region furthest downstream accumulates all the waste that
enters it, contrary to what occurs in the other regions, where part of the waste ows on
to the next region downstream, introduces a particularity into the treatment of this region.
This is compatible with the concept of the river ending in a lake which belongs to a single
region. If, however, the river ends in the sea, the model can be easily adapted by dropping
this dierentiation between regions.
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Additionally, it is easy to see from the previous reasoning that any value of t^
between t and t

(t; C) is compatible with (N;C; t; t). Then we have arrived at
the desired result.
Proof of Proposition 4
Let (N;C; t; t) be a problem. First, take i = 1. Given that this region is the
most upstream region in the river, it is straightforward that all the waste in this
segment is of its own responsibility. Then, l11() = l
1
1() = c1.
Take now any i 2 f2; : : : ; n   1g. In this case, if t 2 (0; 1) we have that ci 11 t
units of waste entered region i  1. Then, ci 1t1 t units of waste entered region i
from the immediate upstream region, i  1, and ci 1t21 t of these units left region
i to the immediate downstream region, i + 1. Therefore, ci 1  t units of the
waste present in region i are responsibility of the regions situated upstream
from i. Then, we have that lii() = ci   ci 1  t. If t = 1, we have that ci
equals 0 for all i 2 f1; : : : ; n  1g and, therefore, lii() = 0. Finally, if t = 0, we
have that all the waste present in region i is of its own responsibility and, thus,
lii() = ci. In situations in which there is uncertainty over t, t 2 [t; t(t; C)], we
can summarize all these expressions and we have that lii() = ci   ci 1  t(t; C)
and l
i
i() = ci   ci 1  t for all i 2 f2; : : : ; n  1g.
Finally, take i = n. Consider rst the case in which t 2 (0; 1). In this case,
we have that cn 11 t units of waste entered region n   1. Then, cn 1t1 t units of
waste entered and remain in region n from its upstream regions and, then,
lnn() = cn   cn 1t1 t , given that n is the most downstream region. Consider now
the case in which t = 1. In this case, there is no information at all about
how much of the waste is the responsibility of region n. Then, lnn() 2 [0; cn].
Finally, if t = 0, we have that all the waste present in region n is of its own
responsibility and, thus, lnn() = cn. It is easy to see that all these expressions
can be summarized as in the proposition. Then, the result is proved.
Proof of Proposition 5
In the proof of Proposition 3 (Equation (3)), we have shown that, knowing
the transfer rate t and the cost vector C, we can deduce the amount of waste
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discharged by each region. This amount, denoted by Vi(t; C) is given by the
following formula:
Vi(t; C) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
ci
1 t if i = 1,
ci
1 t   ci 1t1 t if i 2 f2; : : : ; n  1g,
ci   ci 1t1 t if i = n.
Now, we have to show that i() = Vi(s; C). The case of i = n is straightforward
given that jn() = 0 for all j < n and nn() = Vi(s; C) by denition. We focus
now on the case of i = 1. By denition of , we have that j1() = c1  sj 1 for
all j 2 f1; : : : ; n  1g and n1 () = c1s
n 1
1 s . Note that
1() =
n 1X
j=1
j1() +
c1  sn 1
1  s :
Given that
(1  s) 
n 1X
j=1
j1() = c1   c1  sn 1;
we obtain that 1() = c11 s = V1(s; C).
Finally, consider the case of i 2 f2; : : : ; n  1g. By denition of , we have that
ji () = 0 for all j < i, ji () = ci  sj i   ci 1  sj+1 i for all j 2 fi; : : : ; n   1g
and ni () = cis
n i ci 1sn+1 i
1 s . Note that
i() =
n 1X
j=i
ji () +
ci  sn i   ci 1  sn+1 i
1  s :
Given that
(1  s) 
n 1X
j=i
ji () = ci   ci  sn i   ci 1  s+ ci 1  sn+1 i;
we obtain that i() = ci ci 1s1 s = Vi(s; C) and the proposition is proved.
Proof of Theorem 1
First, it is easy to see that the Upstream Responsibility rule  satises LR, NDR,
CR and MIT. To prove the other implication, consider a problem (N;C; t; t) and
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its corresponding t

(t; C) inferred from Proposition 3. Let x be a rule satisfying
LR, NDR, CR and MIT. We are going to show that x has to correspond to .
We will calculate the assignment given by x in n steps. In the j th step, we
calculate the values of xji () for all i 2 f1; : : : ; ng.
 Step 1: We distribute the cost c1. In this case, by NDR, x1i () = 0 for all
i > 1. Then, by denition of a rule, x11() = c1. If n = 1, the proof is
nished. If n > 1, go to step 2.
 Step j, with j 2 f2; : : : ; ng: We distribute the cost cj . By the appli-
cation of NDR, xji (N;C; t; t) = 0 for all i > j. Consider other problem
(N;C; s; s), where s = t+t

(t;C)
2 . Now, we have two cases:
{ If n > j, we have by LR that xjj(N;C; s; s) = cj   cj 1  s. We
are going to prove that xjj(N;C; s; s) = x
j
j(N;C; t; t). If t = s =
t

(t; C), it is straightforward that they are equal. For the rest of the
cases, consider all problems (N;C; r; r) such that r 2 [t; s). Then, by
LR we have that xjj(N;C; r; r) = cj   cj 1  r. Given that r   t <
t

(t; C) r, we have by MIT that P
i<j
xji (N;C; r; r) 
P
i<j
xji (N;C; t; t)
and then, by denition, xjj(N;C; r; r)  xjj(N;C; t; t). Therefore,
xjj(N;C; t; t)  cj   cj 1  (s   ") for all "  0. Similarly, we can
deduce that xjj(N;C; u; u)  xjj(N;C; t; t) for all u 2 (s; t(t; C)] and,
then, xjj(N;C; t; t)  cj   cj 1  (s + ") for all "  0. Then, the
unique possibility is that xjj(N;C; t; t) = x
j
j(N;C; s; s). Therefore,
xjj(N;C; t; t) = cj   cj 1  s.
If s = 0, we have that xjj(N;C; t; t) = cj and the proof of step j is
nished. Then, go to step j + 1.
If, however, s > 0, let us concentrate rst in the case of j = 2. Then,
we have by denition that x21(N;C; t; t) = c1  s and the proof of step
2 is nished. Now, go to step 3.
If s > 0 and j  3, we have that
j 1P
i=1
xji (N;C; t; t) = cj 1  s. By CR,
xji (N;C; t; t)  xj 1k (N;C; t; t) = xjk(N;C; t; t)  xj 1i (N;C; t; t) for all
i; k 2 f1; : : : ; j 1g. Or, equivalently, xji (N;C; t; t)
j 1P
i=1
xj 1i (N;C; t; t) =
xj 1i (N;C; t; t) 
j 1P
i=1
xji (N;C; t; t) for all i 2 f1; : : : ; j   1g.
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Given that
j 1P
i=1
xj 1i (N;C; t; t) = cj 1 and that we also know from
step j 1 that xj 1i (N;C; t; t) = ci  sj 1 i  ci 1  sj i, we have that
for all i 2 f1; : : : ; j   1g,
xji (N;C; t; t) =
ci  sj 1 i   ci 1  sj i
cj 1
 cj 1  s:
Therefore, for all i 2 f1; : : : ; j   1g,
xji (N;C; t; t) = ci  sj i   ci 1  sj+1 i:
Now, go to step j + 1.
{ If n = j, we have by LR that xnn(N;C; s; s) = cn   cn 1s1 s . We are
going to prove that xnn(N;C; s; s) = x
n
n(N;C; t; t). If t = s = t

(t; C),
it is straightforward that they are equal. For the rest of the cases,
consider all problems (N;C; r; r) such that r 2 [t; s). Then, by LR we
have that xnn(N;C; r; r) = cn  cn 1r1 r . Given that r  t < t

(t; C) r,
we have by MIT that
P
i<n
xni (N;C; r; r) 
P
i<n
xni (N;C; t; t) and then,
by denition, xnn(N;C; r; r)  xnn(N;C; t; t). Therefore, xnn(N;C; t; t) 
cn  cn 1(s ")1 (s ") for all "  0. Similarly, we can deduce that xnn(N;C; u; u) 
xnn(N;C; t; t) for all u 2 (s; t(t; C)] and, then, xnn(N;C; t; t)  cn  
cn 1(s+")
1 (s+") for all "  0. Then, the unique possibility is that xnn(N;C; t; t) =
xnn(N;C; s; s). Therefore, x
n
n(N;C; t; t) = cn   cn 1s1 s and, by deni-
tion,
n 1P
i=1
xni (N;C; t; t) =
cn 1s
1 s . If j = 2, this implies that x
2
1(N;C; t; t) =
c1s
1 s . If j  3 and s = 0, we have that xjj(N;C; t; t) = cj . If j  3
and s > 0, we have by CR that xni (N;C; t; t)  xn 1k (N;C; t; t) =
xnk (N;C; t; t) xn 1i (N;C; t; t) for all i; k 2 f1; : : : ; n 1g. Or, equiva-
lently, we have that xni (N;C; t; t)
n 1P
i=1
xn 1i (N;C; t; t) = x
n 1
i (N;C; t; t)
n 1P
i=1
xni (N;C; t; t) for all i 2 f1; : : : ; n  1g.
Given that
n 1P
i=1
xn 1i (N;C; t; t) = cn 1 and that we also know from
step j   1 that xn 1i (N;C; t; t) = ci  sn 1 i   ci 1  sn i, we have
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that for all i 2 f1; : : : ; n  1g,
xni (N;C; t; t) =
ci  sn i 1   ci 1  sn i
cn 1
 cn 1  s
1  s :
Therefore, for all i 2 f1; : : : ; n  1g,
xni (N;C; t; t) =
ci  sn i   ci 1  sn i+1
1  s :
Proof of Proposition 6
The following examples prove that the axioms are independent.
Limits of Responsibility: The UES rule,  satises NDR, CR and MIT. However,
it does not satisfy LR as we have shown in Example 2.
No Downstream Responsibility: Let ! be the following rule:
!ji (N;C; t; t) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
ci   ci 1  s if i = j < n,
ci   ci 1s1 s if i = j = n,
ci 2  s if i = j + 1,
cis
1 s if i+ 1 = j = n,
0 otherwise,
where s = t+t

(t;C)
2 and c0 is set to 0.
It is easy to see that this rule ! satises MIT, LR and CR. However, the following
example shows that it does not satisfy NDR. Let N = f1; 2; 3g, C = f10; 10; 10g,
t = 0 and t = 1 be a cost allocation problem. We have that !23(N;C; t; t) =
5
2 ,
while NDR states that !23(N;C; t; t) = 0.
Consistent Responsibility: Let ' be the following rule:
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'ji (N;C; t; t) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
0 if i > j,
ci   ci 1  s if i = j < n,
ci   ci 1s1 s if i = j = n,
cj 1s
j 1 if i < j < n,
cj 1
j 1  s1 s if i < j = n,
where s = t+t

(t;C)
2 and c0 is set to 0.
It is easy to see that ' satises LR, NDR and MIT. However, the following
example shows that it does not satisfy CR. Let N = f1; 2; 3g, C = f10; 10; 5g,
t = 0 and t = 1 be a cost allocation problem. We have that '22() = 253 ,
'31() = 1, '32() = 1 and '21() = 53 . Then, '22()  '31() = 253 6= 53 = '21()  '32(),
while CR would imply that '22()  '31() = '21()  '32().
Monotonicity with respect to Information on the transfer rate: Let  be the
following rule:
ji (N;C; t; t) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
0 if i > j,
ci  tj i   ci 1  tj+1 i if i  j < n,
ci   ci 1t1 t if i = j = n,
citj i ci 1tj i+1
1 t if i < j = n,
where c0 is set to 0 and the indeterminate form 0
0 is set to 1.
It is easy to see that  satises LR, NDR and CR. However, the following
example shows that it does not satisfy MIT. Let (N;C; t; t) and (N;C; u; u) be
two cost allocation problems, with N = f1; 2g, C = f10; 20g, t = 0, t = 1 and
u = u = 14 . We have that 
2
1(N;C; t; t) = 0 and 
2
1(N;C; u; u) =
10
3 , although
MIT would imply that 21(N;C; u; u)  21(N;C; t; t).
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